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In this paper, an attempt has been made to analyse the industrial workers'
wages, in large-scale manufacturing, in the context of interaction between insti-
tutional and non-institutional forces. The growth in the real wages of industrial
workers, unionization and employment are explained in the framework of a
simultaneous- equation estimation. The study finds that Pakistan's data are
suggestive of an interdependence between the real wage gains and the extent of
unionization. Trade unions exert an upward pressure on wages but rising wages in
turn facilitate unionization.
That employment -generation has lagged behind the growth in output and
investment in the manufacturing sectors of the developing countries can hardly be
disputed in the light of the evidence accumulated during the past two decades. Factor
price distortions, specifically rising real wages of the industrial workers, have been
offered as major explanations for the unsatisfactory performance and low labour-
absorption capacity of manufacturing industries in the underdeveloped world. This
inference is based on 'elasticity optimism' engendered by production functions
estimated for many developing countries. Besides the conceptual and empirical
problems involved in the estimation of the production functions, these studies tend
to be highly aggregative and fail to reckon with the forces involved in a joint
determination of wagesand employment.
In contrast with the studies on the allocative role of wages, wage behaviour
over time and its determinents are relatively less thoroughly explored in the literature.
An investigation of this kind is important because the analysis of the rising real wages
- a phenomenon observed in most of the developing countries - affords an identi-
fication of factors operatingon wage structure, thereby yieldingpolicy-relevant
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insights. The few research studies that did attempt to explain changesin real wages
in the Third Worldhardly yielded consistent conclusions regardingthe sources of rise
in real wages.
Turner and Jackson [28], Berg [4], Kilby [12] and Knight [13] attributed
improvement in real wages in various African countries to institutional forces,
especially the government. On the other hand Ramos [21] has suggested risingskill
level as one of the explanatory variablesresponsible for improvement in real wagesin
Latin America. Richard Webb [29] thinks that the whole question of policy -versus-
market is irrelevant, and has argued that the source of wage increase is clearly an
interaction between the market and the non-market forces.
Most of these studies fail to incorporate the influence of agricultural growth on
the real wages of industrial workers. Similarly, in most cases the role of trade unions
in influencing changes in the industrial real wages has been assumed away. It has
often been maintained that trade unions have no independent effect on wages
- an assertion made plausible by surplus-labour models.
. In this paper an attempt is made to ascertain the influence of agricultural
growth on the real wages of industrial workers. In addition, trade unions are.
explicitly incorporated in our analysis. Using data on Pakistan's large-scale manu-
facturing for 1949-69, a set of three simultaneous equations is estimated wherein
real wage changes, growth in unionization and industrial employment are jointly
determined. The model is discussed in the Section I, while the results are reported in
Section II. Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks make up Section III. The











I. INTERDEPENDENCEBETWEENGROWTHRATES IN TRADE
UNIONISMAND REAL WAGEAND EMPLOYMENT
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=
Real wages of industrial workers;
Unionization - trade union membership divided by industrial
employment;
Value added in large-scale manufacturing at constant price of
1959-60;
Product of the percentage of industrial workers covered by the
minimum wage legislation and the legal minimum wages, deflat-
ed by cost of living index;
Agricultural productivity - value added in agriculture at con-
stant prices of 1959-60 divided by employment in agriculture;
Threshold variable - taking the value of I whenever (VA ) >
[0.02] and zero otherwise; LA
Industrial employment;
Dummy variable to reflect government intervention taking the
value of I for the year when government measures suppressed
unions activity; and
Variable for time trend.=
Dots on W, E and (T/E) etc. are proportionate changes of these variables.
Each of these equations is explained below.
Whether trade unions in developing countries have an independent effect on
the real wagesof industrial workers or not hasbeen a matter of controversy. Evidence
from the developed countries shows a positive association between a rise in union
militancy and wage increase. However, quite a few studies, using econometric
models of aggregate union growth, postulate the reverse relation as well: changes in
real wages as one of the variables contributing to union growth. Since on a priori
grounds, one can argue for both of these hypotheses, a proper procedure would be
to specify a model that allows for interdependence between union growth and
changes in real wage. Similarly, industrial employment and wagesare joint outcome
of the employers' decisions. This study attempts within a simultaneous-equations
framework to explain changes in industrial employment, unionism and real wages.
The model in the deterministic form is givenbelow.
Equation No.1: Detem1inantsof Growth in Manufacturing Wages
Wage changes are hypothesised to be positively affected by changes in
manufacturing output, agricultural averageproduct, unionization and minimum wage
legislation. The first two factors can be regarded as market forces and the other two
as institutional forces operating upon the level of real wages. Admittedly, the
demarcation line between the market and non-market forces is thin. In this. paper,
proportionate change in manufacturing output (VM) is used to simulate shifts in
the demand for labour due to increased output. This variable (VM) is, however,
lagged by one year because decisions regarding the level of employment are often
made well in advance and the bonus payments to individual workers are generally
made after annual accounts of the firms are closed.
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A change in average agricultural productivity, 1 working through factors and
product market interdependencies, is likely to have two mutually reinforcing effects
on industrial wages. First, a rise in agricultural productivity may restrain migration to
urban areas by creating demand for labour within the agriculture sector. This may
shift leftward the supply schedule in the urban labour market. Secondly, since a
growth in averageincome in agriculture increases the demand for industrial products,
the demand schedule for industrial labour will be shifted rightward. However, the
net effect of these shifts in the supply and demand schedules on industrial wages
will vary with the distribution of income in agriculture sector and the degree of
governmental intervention in the determination of industrial wages.
Government intervention is generally considered a major factor influencing
wages in the developing countries. It is, however, difficult to devise an appropriate
proxy which captures the totality of the effects of state intervention on wages. State
can influence directly at plant level through industrial courts; it may affect the wage
structure indirectly in the industrial sector by changing wage scales of its own
employees. Minimum-wage legislation represents another measure which has a
direct bearing on wages in the manufacturing sector. This study is confined to
assessing the impact of minimum-wage legislation on manufacturing wages. In the
estimation procedure used, the variable of minimum-wage legislation (WL) is re-
presented by a product of the percentage of industrial workers covered by wage
legislation and the legalminimum wages,deflated by cost-of-living index.
Wage equation (1) has been specified in the light of the conjectures offered
by the dualistic models of Lewis [14] and others wherein agricultural averageproduct
has been regarded as supply price of urban labour.2 In this equation some of the
important variables, however, have not been reckoned with. Since our analysis is
confmed to average wages in large-scale manufacturing which may vary with a com-
positional shift ill the manufacturing industries andlor changes in the skill of the
work force, any attempt to explicitly incorporate these factors is precluded by lack
of data.
This requirement cannot be satisfied in a developing country like Pakistan, where
employment more than doubled during the period under enquiry. Furthermore, the
level of unionization (TIE) is assumed to reflect the level of union militancy and has
been specified as a determinant of wage changes by both Hines and Ashenfelter.3
To the extent that we are concerned with an explanation of real wage changes associ-
ated with union militancy, a change in the level of unionization is a more relevant
proxy than changes in trade union membership.
Changes in real wages, both current (W) and lagged by one year (W) l' are
used as explanatory variables to estimate their "credit effect" on the growth of
unionization in Pakistan. Government measures - e.g. the ban on strikes during
the imposition of Martial Law (1958 -59), the suspension of fundamental rights
during the war with India (1965 -66), and the banning of the Communist Party
which had a substantial following in the labour movement (1953 -54) - presumably
have had adverse repercussionson union growth. The effect of these factors on union
growth is assessedby using a dummy variable (AL) which takes the value of one in
these years and of zero in other years. Since there are hardly any reliable data on
the rate of unemployment in Pakistan, the proportionate changes in the employ-
ment4 of factory workers (E) are used, followingAshenfelter, to ascertain the effect
of this potential union membership growth (E) on the growth in the level of unioni-
zation (TIE).
The specification of this equation has been based on the empirical studies
conducted in other countries. Econometric models of union growth have been used
by Hines for UK [9], Ashenfelter and Pencaval for the US [2] and Sharpe for
Australia [23]. A critical evaluation of these studies is givenin the study by George
S. Bain and EI Sheikh [3], wherein the real wages, the level of unionization, and
a measure of unemployment or employment emerge as major explanatory variables
of the trade union growth. Mutual dependence between trade union growth and wage
gains has also been assessed by Ashenfelter [1] and Hines [6]. Since they use
changes in retail prices as a proxy for real wage changes, their estimation procedure
Equation No.2: Determinants of Unionization
3Due to the multicollineaIity introduced by (TIE) Ashenfelter dropped it and used (T) in
actual estimation. To that extent, his empirical procedure is misspecified.
4It may be recalled here that this use of vaIiable (E) has been criticized by Mancke [15]
who termed it "neaIly definitional due to union security provisions". George S. Bain and EI
Sheikh [3] are also critical of its use because (E) has more than one effect - e.g. the growth in
potential union membership, the labour market tightness, and changes in the employment
distribution between high and low union density sector. Hence the lumping of these three
different effects into a single variable (E) is considered inappropriate. Ashenfelter provides a
cogent defence with regaId to the first criticism by maintaining that there is no reason why a
given change in potential union membership (E) should automatica1ly produce the same pro-
portionate change in actual union membership (T). The second set of criticism still remains
unanswered.
We have used changes in the level of unionization (TIE) as a dependent variable
in our estimation. However, actual union membership (T) is preferable to the level
of unionization (TIE) for explaining trade union growth if the employment or
potential union membership does not vary widely during the period under analysis.
lCuriously enough, the majority of research studies on manufacturing wages in the devel-
oping world failed to incorporate agricultural productivity as one of the explanatory variables.
2The relationships between the average product in agriculture and urban wages postulated
by these models are, however, demonstrated to be quite restrictive [25] and [30].
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fails to reckon with the "credit effect"S of the wage rise on union growth. In this
study, real wages are explicitly introduced to assess the "credit effect" as well as to
infer about the interdependence between the growth of union power and real wage
gains.
Departing from the earlier studies on the subject, the retail price index is not
used in this study as an explanatory variable of the trade union growth. Price rises
are considered to be conveying a kind of "threat effect" (risingpricesmay be perceived
by workers as a threat to their living standard) and a "prosperity effect" (price rises
may indicate the general prosperity of industry). Both these effects are assumed to
have a unidirectional impact: a positive association between the change in retail price
and the changes in trade union membership, because workers tend to organize to
protect their living standards and the employers acquiesce in workers' demands for
better conditions and union recognition in periods of inflation. The reverse, there-
fore, may hold in recessionary conditions.
To the extent that workers aim at improving their living standards, real wage
appears to be a more appropriate explanatory variable for union growth than changes
in price level. In Pakistan, roughly one-third of the workers' compensation, such
as housing and medical facilities is paid in kind. This acts, however, as a cushioning
device in the wake of rising prices and results in a diminution of the threat effect.
The prosperity effect6 of the rising prices may not have an unambiguous relation
with union growth. A concession by employers may result in a reduced eagernessof
the workers to organize or join trade unions, i.e. a defensiveorganization.
The expected positive association between changes in the general price level
and changes in union membership are not borne out universally. Sharpe [23] fmds a
revers~ association in the case of Australia. The finding in other studies - that price
rises do not have a clear impact on union growth - is explained in terms of ad hoc
rationalization: "high rates of inflation tend to numb people's sensitivity to price
rises" [3]. In preliminary exercises, we found that price (cost-of-livingindex) fails
to improve the fit of Equation 2. To make things worse, it also introduces multi-
collinearity. The price changevariable is, therefore, excluded from the equation.
The appropriate lag of an employment function is difficult to determine
a priori. Wecould not follow the earlier studies which used stock adjustment process
because an addition of lagged changes in employment to the list of independent
variables introduces serious multicollinearity. Hence past year's level of employment
(!N)_lwas used instead. Furthermore, time trend and changes in averageagricultural
productivity are also added to assesstheir effect on industrial employment. Average
agricultural productivity in the employment function should capture the influence of
rising supply price of industrial labour on its employment. Non-availabilityof reliable
data on the price of capital precluded the incorporation of this important variable.
The equations were estimated using Two-Stage Least Square with Cochrane
Orcutt procedure to take care of the serial correlation.
II. RESULTS
The demand for labour depends on the level of output and the factor price
ratio. Besides these forces, which determine long-run optimal capital/labour mix,
there are short-term factors such as capacity utilization. In our regression exercise,
employment changes are hypothesized to be explained by changes in real wages (W)
and value added in large-scalemanufacturing (VM).
Equation 1
Two-thirds of the variance in real wage changes is explained by changesin trade
union density (T/E), in value added in manufacturing (VMt 1and in minimum wage
legislation (!N/L). The average agricultural product variable bears the expected sign
but is not significant (Table 1).
The positive influence of trade unions on wages in the presence of presumed
urban unemployment needs explanation. There are reasons to believe that trade
unions are not ineffective even in these circumstances.7 First of all, even when
unemployment prevails, the queue at the factory gate is not very long; secondly,
those outside the factory gate are not perfect substitutes of those inside. This is
because the latter have "internalized the norm of a typical behaviour pattern of
industrial social system" [26], which their counterparts, outside the gate, do not
have. Furthermore, the cost of labour for the period under study (1949-69)
averaged around one-third of the industrial output (value added). Besides, in the
'soft market' environment of Pakistan, wage cost may have been passed on to the
consumers. Together, these factors tend to weaken the employers' resistence to
union demands. Thus, the employed workers, who are a non-competing group, low
labour costs and the sellers market for producers create a conducive atmosphere for
union's positive effect on wages.
There are hardly any data available on union and employer agreements as
these are not public documents in Pakistan. One can only draw inferences about the
strength of collective bargaining from the cases referred to the industrial courts for
Equation No.3: Determinants of Industrial Employment
5Workers credit the unions for a rise in their wages, which in turn facilitate unionization.
6Stagflation of the 1970s would, however, question the existence of prosperity effect of
rising prices.
7Changes in trade union density (T/E) can have a spurious positive correlation with changes
in average wages if: (1) workers move from non-union to unionized sector keeping constant the
union/non-union wage differential; and/or the union/non-union wage differential increases over
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~ adjudication. While in the 1950s only a few caseswere referred to industrial courts,
in the following decades, the number of such cases went up to thousands. However,
around fourth-fifths of those cases were related to the disciplinary actions and pro-
motions and very few cases pertained to claims for higher wagesand bonuses. It can
be argued that most of the wage settlements took place outside the courts through
collective bargaining or conciliation machinery, which explains the mechanism of
the union operation and pressure. The conclusion that trade unions had an inde-
pendent and significant effect on industrial wagesis, therefore, quite plausible.
The other significant variable in the wage equation, the manufacturing output
growth (YM), can be related to a shift in the demand for labour and also reflects
the firm's capacity to pay. The coefficient, which is the elasticity of wages with
respect to output, is 0.72. Gregory [8] conducted a similar exercise, wherein he
regressed industrial real wage changes on per capita G.D.P. changes, using a sample
of 36 developing countries and found the corresponding coefficient of the order of
0.83. His estimation procedure is not exactly the same as adopted in our wage
equation; nonetheless, it provides supporting evidence.
The minimum-wage legislation variable is marginally significant. For the
twenty years under analysis, the minimum wage legislation was applicable to the
years 1963- 69; and even then it covered only a few industries, except for the last
year of the period (1969), when the minimum wage regulations were extended to the
entire manufacturing sector. Despite these factors the positive coefficient of this
variable suggests that minimum wages did raise the average wage of industrial
workers.
Because of the multicollinearity problem, average productivity in agriculture
has turned out to be insignificant.8 A simple regression of changes in real wageson
changes in average agricultural product shows that the latter explains one-third of
the variance in the former. Its coefficient suggests that any change in the average
agricultural product, above the threshold of 2 percent, changes industrial real wages
in the same direction, by about 79 percent of its own change.9 The rising agricul-
tural productivity reflects the labour demand generated by a higher growth in agricul-
ture which may restrain the flow of migrants to urban areas. In the employment
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Equation 2
In the second equation, changes in union density (TIE) are significantly
explained by the lagged changes in real wages(W) I , changes in employment (E)
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and previous year's level of unionization (T/Et 1 (see Table 1). The dummy vari-
able (AL), which reflects the effect of government intervention, is the only explan-
atory variable that fails to qualify the conventional significance test. Its coefficient
is, however, of the expected sign. A positive influence of the changes in real wages
(lagged by one year) on unionization bears out the "credit effect" of real wageson
union growth. Similarly, the negative sign of the levelof unionization (laggedby one
year) on trade union growth reflects the saturation effect. Given the fact that
approximately half of the workers in Pakistan's large-scale manufacturing are union-
ized the negative saturation effect appears plausible.
An inverse association between contemporaneous changes in employment and
changes in union density, a result of our exercise, is not in conformity with earlier
studies. The limited nature of the data on employment and unionization hardly
affords an opportunity for an exhaustive search for non-linearities and lags involved
in their relationship. However, in our preliminary exercises an,addition of the level
of employment lagged by one year (Etl to the list of the above-mentioned explan-
atory variables, at the cost of added multicollinearity and one degree of freedom,
yielded a result which implied that a higher level of employment leads to a rise in
the rate of growth of unionization, of course with a lag. Whythe contemporaneous
changes in employment and unionization bear an inverse association still needs to be
explained.
The observed inverse relationship between current changes in employment and
unionization stems from the nature of unions and the pattern of employment growth
in Pakistan. Trade unions in Pakistan are organized at the level of the plant, and not
at the industrial level. A rise in employment will be reflected in higher union
membership without any lag if employment is generated in the existing unionized
plants. This has not been a normal pattern of employment growth: rather it
occurred through the establishment of new plants. In the newly established plants,
the emergence of an effective trade union may take more than a year or so - of
course, depending on the organizational drive of the outside labour leadership. Thus
a rise in industrial employment may not simultaneously lead to a rise in the union
membership. Furthermore, the management of newly established plant often bids
away the experienced worker from the old plants. This may represent an exodus
from a unionized plant to a non-unionized plant. In these circumstances, it is
possible to have a negative association between changesin employment and the level
of unionization. The possibility of the observed relationship between changes in
employment and unionization being supurious cannot be ruled out. As discussedin
the Data Appendix, the reported employment figures contain erratic fluctuations.
The time trend is used as a proxy for the development of the economy, the ensuing
structural changes and a host of other factors. The negative association between
employment changes and lagged level of employment reflects the declining rates of
employment generation owing to a variety of factors like capital deepening and the
compositional changes of the industrial sector, from labour -intensive to capital-
intensive (e.g. petrochemical) industries.
The introduction of the time trend as an explanatory variable leads to serious
multicollinearity and renders the variables of wage changes and output growth
insignificant, though their coefficients retain the expected signs. A simple regres-
sion of employment changeslOon real wage changes and output explains 20 percent
of the variance. The coefficient of wage changes (significant at the 10-percent
confidence level) is not much different from what EnKson fmds (0.83) for Latin
American countries [7]. Employment sensitivity to wage changes is reflected
by elasticity coefficient. It is interesting to note that Isbister [10] fmds the output
elasticity of demand for labour in the case of Mexico roughly equivalent to .62
estimated for this study. However, Stern estimates the corresponding coefficient at
.40 for the whole of Latin America, which is less than ours. Since the estimation
procedures, level of aggregation, and nature of economies are different, these results
are not strictly comparable.
III. POLICYIMPLICATIONS
Several factors bear upon the policy relevanceof this study. The study is based
on Pakistan's experience of the Fifties and Sixties which may not be a relevant guide
for the futu're. Moreover,data limitations do not permit an exhaustive search for the
non-linearities and lags involved,in the relationship between unionization and em-
ployment. Similarly, specification of the employment function is less than satis-
factory. Notwithstanding these limitations, policy implications of this study are
discussedbelow, in terms of the elasticity co-efficients.
The sensitivity of employment to wage changesand minimum-wage legislation
is borne out by OUr results. The elasticity coefficients of these variables are,
however, smaller than that of the past employment level itself and averageproduct in
agriculture. The negative coefficient of past level of employment is suggestiveof an
upper bound on employment creation occasioned presumably by lack of technolog-
ical options and/or compositional changes in the manufacturing industries, making
them less labour-intensive. A negative elasticity coefficient of average product in
the agriculture sector reflects that agricultural growth, due to green revolution, may
have generated higher demand for labour within agriculture, thereby raising the
Equation 3
The explanation of industrial employment is not very satisfactory. The signif-
icant variables are the time trend and previous year's level of employment itself.
HiE = -12 + .71 VM_l - 0.62W
(1.01) (-1.39)
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labour supply price. It must be noted, however, that employment equation suffers
from specification error as discussed earlier; hence, the above results need to be
interpreted carefully.
The elasticity of wages with respect to output growth is higher than the data
would substantiate. Nonetheless it does indicate a positive association between
these two variables. Rising average product in agriculture creates demand for labour
within agriculture and also checks rise in the prices of food items. Thus, it has a
positive effect on real wages of the workers in large-scale manufacturing. Institu-
tional variables like minimum-wage legislation and trade unions positively affect real
wages of industrial workers. Their elasticity coefficients are of the lower magnitude
than that of output growth and agricultural productivity. To the extent that the
proxy used for measuring trade union strength (the levelof unionization) is deficient,
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Level and membership of trade unions appear to be favourably influenced by
rising agricultural productivity, wage rise and minimum-wage legislation. Workers'
bargaining strength gets enhanced by agricultural growth either through accelerated
job creation and/or rising supply price of labour in urban areas. A very high coeffi-
cient of wagessuggests, through the credit effect, that workers tend to organizemore
in the wake of rising real wages.
On the basis of the above findings, wage rise can hardly be singled out for low
labour-absorptive capacity in large-scale manufacturing. Wagerestraint, therefore,
may not succeed in creating substantial employment expansion. The effect of
unionization on real wages of industrial worker appears low. However, given the
level of aggregation of our study and the fact that unionization is hardly uniform
across firms, the workers in the non-unionized establishments will be at a disadvan-
tageous position vis-a-vis their counterparts in unionized firms. For the sake of
promoting harmonious industrial relations, formation of trade unions and collective




This study suggests that during the 1949- 69 period, the behaviour of the real
wages of industrial workers in Pakistan was influenced by both market and insti-
tutional forces. Rising averageagricultural product was associatedwith expansion in
agricultural employment, thereby arresting the flow of workers to urban areas, which
in turn led to higher urban wages. A higher growth of manufacturing output also
increased industrial wage because of the higher (derived) demand for industrial
labour. Minimum wage legislation has had a positive effect on the averagewagesof
labour in large-scale manufacturing. A positive association between changes in the
level of unionization and real wage changes reflects an interdependence between
the two: real wagesaffect and, in turn, are affected by trade union growth.
Our empirical exercise suggests that besides real wagesthe growth in industrial
employment, the level of unionization already attained, and government interven-
tion have influenced the rate of growth in union density during the period under
analysis. Thus roughly the same set of variables constitutes the determinants of
trade union growth in Pakistan and the western developed countries, despite diverse
politico-economic conditions. Industrial employment was found to be inversely
related to growth in real wages. It is difficult to quantify the job loss occasioned by
the rise in real wages because the price of capital could not be incorporated in the
analysis. Moreover, to the extent that the jobs in the tertiary sectors are related to
the level of productivity in the manufacturing sector, the changes in its wage level
then simply perform intersectoral employment reallocation. Furthermore, the
decelerating rate of growth in industrial employment may have been simply due to
lack of technological options.
Employment .19
(.90) -.24 -.08 -.11 -.09 .05
-.17 (- .72) (-.001) (- .75)
Wages +.68 +.11 +.16 +.20 +.20 +.10
(+.22) (+,15) (+.17) (+.08) (+.03)
Levelof
Unionisation - .23 0.88 +.14 +1.22 +.002 -.38
Union
Membership -.12 0.60 +0.1 +.99 +.32 -.22
*Elasticity coefficients reported in this table are taken from different variants of esti-
mating equations (see Appendix Table II. Moreover, two of the three equations are over- identi-




Wage data collected under the Payment of WagesAct 1936 by Ministry of
Labour & Social Welfarehave been used for this analysis. Wagesare reported only
for workers, both production and non-production, who earn less than two hundred
rupees per month. Averagewage at the aggregatelevel of manufacturing sector has
been arrived at by dividing the total wage bill with the number of workers. The
perennial and seasonal industries are lumped together.
There appears to be some reporting errors for few years. For instance, the
average wage registered an increase of roughly 25 percent in 1955 and of 30 percent
in 1962. Similarly, there was a one-third decline in the average wage as compared
to those in the previous years. These spurts may be due to erratic reporting in wage
bill or employment or both.
Despite the fact that wage data are not exclusivelyrelated to an homogeneous
category like production workers, and contain reporting error, we used them in the
regression analysis as a last resort. Since these data refer to low-wage bracket, the
changes in average wages will presumably approximate the changes in production
workers' wages. No adjustment, like three-year moving average, is made for the
reporting errors because it would have introduced a bias.
2. Trade Union Membership
Membership reported in the 25 Yearsof Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-1972 for
the industrial categories of Textiles, Printing Presses, Food, Engineering, Beverages,
Tobacco, Wood and Glass,Chemicalsand Dyes,Leather and Rubber and Miscellaneous
are added to arrive at the total union membership in large scalemanufacturing. The
reported membership, however, may diverge from the actual membership owing to
non -reporting.
3. Employment
The Employment of factory workers reported in the above-mentioned source
is used. It refers to factory workers only. There is no unique defmition of a worker
in the labour laws. Presumably, it covers the production workers and manual non-
production workers. It is, however, exclusive of clerical and supervisory staff.
The employment growth yielded by these data may under-estimate the actual
growth in industrial employment if capital/labour substitution elasticity is higher for
this category than the average. The data as reported possibly contain few reporting
errors. For example, the employment reported for 1955 is half of the preceding
and the following years. The reported employment, similarly, declines after 1963
until 1968. For 1969 it registers a 30-percent rise.










4. Value Added in Large-Scale Manufacturing
Khan and Bergan have given estimates of the gross value added in large-scale
manufacturing for -the period from 1949-50 to 1959-60. For the subsequent
period, the data are taken from the Economic Survey, 1974-75. The estimates of the
gross value added are based on the Censusof Manufacturing Industries, 1959- 60 with
an adjustment for the undercoverage and mis-reporting. For other years, the
quantum index of manufacturing is applied to these bench-mark data for estimating
the gross value added. The estimates of the grossvalue added in the national income
accounts were revised in 1964-65 and 1969-70 because of the availabilityof improved
estimates of the quantum index of production. The value added is reported for the
fiscal year (July-June) and is averaged for two consecutive years to get the calendar
year (common) figures for regression.
5. Average Agriculture Product
The value added data for agriculture (at constant factor cost of 1959-60) are
divided by the employment in agriculture. The employment in agriculture isestimated
on the basis of the population censuses of 1951 and 1961 and from the Labour
Force Surveys of various years. The Censusesof 1951 and 1961 provide information
on employment in agriculture for these two years. The annual compound growth
rate, based on these two years, is used to estimate the employment in agriculture for
the intervening years. The Labour Force Surveys, which provide information on the
percentage distribution of the labour force in different sectors, are used to estimate
the employment in agriculture for the 1963- 69 period. The procedure used in
employment estimation, however, assumes a yearly growth at a uniform rate during
the 1950s. Similarly, for the period from 1963 onward the reliability of the esti-
mated employment depends on the quality of the data reported in various labour
force surveys.
6. Minimum WageLegislation
This variable is the product of (a) the percentage of manufacturing employ-
ment covered by minimum laws; and (b) the minimum wages fixed (average of
Lahore and Karachi zones). This is deflated by the cost-of-living index. During the
1963- 68 period, few industries were covered by the Minimum Wage Legislation.
Their share in the manufacturing employment is taken from the various Censusesof
Manufacturing Industries. For 1969, however, the minimum wage is extended to the
entire manufacturing sector.
The data used in the regressionanalysis are givenin Appendix Table I.
---- - -- --- - - ---



































































Trade Union Employment Value Added Agriculture Minimum Disciplinary Real
Variable Membership Factory in Large-Scale Average Wage Measures Wagesin
(in Thousands) Workers Manufacturing Product Rupees "Dummy" Rupees
(in Thousands) (in Million Rupees
Rupees)
Year (T) (E) (VM) VL/LA (WL) (AL) (W)
1949 44.43 131.52 277 1094 0 0 803
'"
1950 50.54 123.76 342 1100 0 0 900 ;:$
;:$
1951 52.74 130.74 406 1043 0 0 944
1952 45.34 151.85 502 976 0 0 894 !:;<
1953 35.96 186.91 646 1022 0 0 906
;:s
1954 35.48 205.18 802 1063 0 1 954
1955 45.29 120.98 942 1049 0 0 1251
1956 45.84 213.53 1018 1052 0 0 1238
1957 31.05 250.90 1068 1054 0 0 1116
1958 31.53 297.42 1128 1063 0 1 1147
1959 45.03 244.92 1159 1065 0 1 1075
1960 66.66 224.52 1394 1045 0 0 1187
1961 94.20 286.61 1671 1070 0 0 1088
1962 72.32 285.52 1934 1095 0 0 1515
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